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875 
LIGHT IN THE DARKNESS: HOW THE LEATPR 
STANDARDS GUIDE LEGISLATORS IN 
REGULATING LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO 
CELL SITE LOCATION RECORDS  
SUSAN FREIWALD* 
Introduction 
The new ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Law Enforcement Access 
to Third Party Records (LEATPR Standards) set out a worthy goal.  They 
endeavor to “provide the framework for legislatures . . . to carry out th[e] 
critical task” of “establishing the appropriate level of protection” for those 
records held by institutional third parties to which law enforcement seeks 
access during criminal investigations.1  This article measures the Standards’ 
success by assessing the guidance they provide legislators2 interested in 
updating pertinent law regarding one specific type of data.  Scholars should 
not expect the Standards to yield the same conclusions they would have 
furnished had they been able to draft a set of standards by themselves.3  The 
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 * Susan Freiwald, Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law.  I 
thank research librarian John Shafer, my research assistant Everett Monroe, and my editors 
at the Oklahoma Law Review for their valuable help.  I also thank the following people for 
their helpful feedback on drafts and the symposium presentation: Catherine Crump, Jim 
Dempsey, Hanni Fakhoury, Andrew Ferguson, David Gray, Stephen Henderson, Mark 
Jaycox, Stephanie Pell, Christopher Slobogin, and special thanks to Judge Stephen Smith.  
All views, and any errors, are entirely my own. 
 1. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD 
PARTY RECORDS 16 (2013) [hereinafter LEATPR STANDARDS]; see also id. at 2 (“[B]ecause 
the federal constitutional regulation has historically been slight, and because other regulation 
has occurred in an ad hoc manner, there is no existing framework via which legislatures . . . 
can make the difficult decisions regarding what records should be protected and the scope of 
such protection.”).  This article will refer to individual standards using the format 
‘STANDARD x.x.’   
 2. Although the Standards purport to offer guidance to agencies and courts acting in 
their supervisory capacity as well, see id., this article will focus only on the guidance they 
offer to legislatures.  
 3. Because they reflect the collective wisdom of a panel of experts holding a spectrum 
of perspectives, the Standards should carry more presumptive weight than a scholarly article 
written by one or two people.  Although jointly authored works usually reflect shared 
perspectives, a recent article deserves special attention because of its authors’ different 
backgrounds, as well as its significant contributions. See Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher 
Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement 
Access to Location Data That Congress Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117 (2012) 
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Standards emerged after years of painstaking consensus building and 
compromise4—no individual committee member got entirely what he 
wanted.5  Nonetheless, not every product of a committee turns out to have 
been worth the effort, which is why this article assesses the Standards’ 
value. 
This article measures the Standards’ contribution by looking at the light 
they shed on the regulation of one particular investigative method, the 
legality of which could not be more in need of illumination: law 
enforcement’s compelled disclosure of cell phone records that reveal 
customers’6 locations.  Over the past decade, a body of case law has 
addressed the procedural hurdle law enforcement agents must overcome to 
compel cell phone service providers (providers) to disclose records that 
indicate the cell towers or sites that a cell phone user’s phone has used to 
communicate.7  While agents can obtain such cell tower data (location data) 
in real-time, including as the cell phone user moves from place to place,8 
                                                                                                                 
(recommending statutory language for law enforcement access to cell site location 
information).   
 4. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 1-2 (describing a three-year drafting 
process and two-year revision process before approval); Stephen E. Henderson, Real-Time 
and Historic Location Surveillance After United States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly 
Mosaic Approach, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 810 (2013) (“The ABA process is 
appropriately thorough and rigorous, consisting of several stages at which all interested 
parties have a voice.”); see also id. at 836 (describing further the ABA process). 
 5. At the live symposium at which I presented an early version of this article, some 
committee members expressed displeasure with some of the compromises made and 
provisions they specifically opposed that were nonetheless included.  Because the Standards 
generating process mirrors the legislative process more than the scholarly process, 
academics should refrain from judging the Standards as they would a scholarly piece.  
 6. The records disclosed are not always customer records.  See infra Part I.C 
(discussing questions about what constitutes a “record” under federal statutory law).  
 7. See generally Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth 
Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681 (2011) (describing recent 
cases); Pell & Soghoian, supra note 3 (same); see also In re Application of the United States 
for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 830-36 (S.D. Tex. 2010), vacated, 724 
F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013) (describing developments in cell phone tracking technology in 
detailed fact finding). 
 8. See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 3, at 134-41 (discussing legal backdrop for 
prospective or real-time location data acquisition); see also Adam Koppel, Warranting a 
Warrant: Fourth Amendment Concerns Raised by Law Enforcement’s Warrantless Use of 
GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1061, 1081 n.160 (2010) 
(collecting cases); Steven B. Toeniskoetter, Preventing a Modern Panopticon: Law 
Enforcement Acquisition of Real-Time Cellular Tracking Data, RICH. J.L. & TECH., Summer 
2007, at 16, 24, 29 (same). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/7
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this article focuses on law enforcement’s acquisition of records stored with 
the provider that contain such location data (location records), so as to stay 
within the Standards’ ambit.9   
Any member of Congress10 interested in the regulation of law 
enforcement access to location records stored by providers would first 
determine whether the current law requires updating.  As Part I elaborates, 
the existing federal statutory treatment of the compelled disclosure of 
location records suffers from an extreme lack of clarity.  
The relevant statute is the Stored Communications Act (SCA).11  
Congress passed the SCA in 1986 as part of the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act,12 when the cell phone industry was in its infancy.13  The SCA 
does not expressly mention location records.  It does not even resolve the 
threshold question of what counts as a record.14  In the intervening twenty-
eight years, Congress has not meaningfully updated the SCA’s records 
access provisions, let alone clarified whether they apply to location 
records.15  Even when courts have determined or assumed that the SCA 
does pertain, they have found the statute to be unclear about exactly what 
procedural hurdles it requires before law enforcement agents may compel 
access to location records, and they have thus reached quite different 
conclusions.16  Surely location records require the “greater consistency” the 
                                                                                                                 
 9. The distinction between historical records of location data and real-time access to 
location data is not straightforward.  See infra Part I.C. 
 10. For brevity’s sake, I discuss only how a member of Congress would approach the 
task of updating federal statutory law for law enforcement’s compelled disclosure of location 
records.  Current federal statutory surveillance law sets a floor for legislation by the states.  
See United States v. McKinnon, 721 F.2d 19, 21 n.1 (1st Cir. 1983).  
 11. Title II, § 201, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1860 (1986) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2012)).  In addressing the compelled disclosure of location 
records, most judges have applied the SCA, but some have questioned whether the SCA 
even covers location data.  See infra Part I.A. 
 12. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).  
 13. See infra Part I.C.  
 14. Id.  
 15. Congress did raise the standard for access to non-content records from a relevance 
standard to an intermediate, less than probable cause standard in 1994.  Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Title I, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) 
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010).  At that time, the director of the FBI 
indicated that the new law was making no change in how existing law regulated access to 
location records, but he did not specify that regulation.  In re Application for Pen Register & 
Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 762-63 (S.D. Tex. 
2005) [hereinafter S. Dist. Tex. Decision]. 
 16. See infra Part I.B. 
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Standards’ drafters describe as necessary for existing law.17  Courts and 
commentators have called upon Congress to act.18 
Assuming that interested members of Congress recognize the need to 
address the compelled disclosure of location records, they would likely turn 
to the federal appellate courts’ interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to 
ensure that any legislation they draft satisfies constitutional requirements.19  
To explore whether congressional drafters would benefit, in addition, from 
consulting the Standards, Part II describes the two federal appellate cases 
that have addressed how the Fourth Amendment regulates the compelled 
disclosure of location records.20  Rather than clearly direct federal 
legislators on how to draft constitutionally compliant regulations,21 the 
federal appellate courts have issued divided opinions that clash concerning 
core constitutional questions.  In the last three years, the Fifth and Third 
Circuits have reached opposite conclusions about whether the third party 
rule precludes claims by cell phone users to a Fourth Amendment interest in 
their location records.22  In addition, neither appellate decision resolved 
whether cell phone users entertain reasonable expectations of privacy in 
their location data.23  As Part II explains, both decisions effectively left that 
issue for magistrate judges to resolve, a delegation of responsibility that 
                                                                                                                 
 17. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 5; see also infra text accompanying note 29. 
 18.   See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 294 (7th Cir. 2011) (Wood, 
J., dissenting), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1534 (2012); The Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance 
Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 7-9 (2012) (statement of Catherine Crump, Staff 
Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union) [hereinafter Crump Statement] (pressing 
Congress to regulate location data access to clarify and strengthen restrictions in the face of 
disparate practices and insufficient privacy protections across all levels of law enforcement); 
Pell & Soghoian, supra note 3, at 124, 133, 150  (calling the need for federal legislation 
“urgent” and “critical”). 
 19. A few members of Congress have recognized the need.  See S. 639, 113th Cong. (as 
introduced Mar. 21, 2013) (requiring a warrant to collect geolocation information, including 
cell site location data); H.R. 983, 113th Cong. (as introduced Mar. 6, 2013) (similar).   
 20. In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell-Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013) 
[hereinafter Fifth Cir. Decision]; In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider 
of Elec. Commc’ns Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) 
[hereinafter Third Cir. Decision].  
 21. State legislators will, of course, be interested in federal constitutional law as well.  A 
few states have begun, or attempted to begin, the process of updating their laws to address 
law enforcement access to location records.  See, e.g., S. 1052, 2013 Leg., 83d Reg. Sess. 
(Tex. 2013); S. 1434, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (vetoed by Governor on Sept. 
30, 2012). 
 22. See infra Part II.A. 
 23. See infra Part II.B.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/7
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lower court judges likely view as unwelcome.24  Moreover, both decisions 
failed to define clearly what counts as a location record, which remains a 
glaring omission in the law.  
With applicable statutory law confusing and constitutional law 
inconsistent and incomplete, even minimal guidance would be valuable to 
legislators.  But the Standards provide much more than minimal guidance.  
Part III describes the Standards’ significant contributions to a hypothetical 
legislative process in which legislators supplement the understanding of the 
law they derive from reading federal appellate and even lower court cases 
by consulting the Standards.  For example, neither the SCA nor current 
interpretations of Fourth Amendment law directs courts to appreciate fully 
the personal nature of location information and the way in which records 
are created.  Because the Standards draw on a wider body of law than 
Fourth Amendment principles, they offer a richer set of factors for 
legislators to consider.  Part III also discusses how the Standards’ text and 
commentary remind legislators of the narrow scope of the third party 
doctrine that has so occupied the federal appellate courts.  In particular, the 
Standards emphasize that users waive privacy interests only when they 
actually voluntarily divulge their information to third parties, and even then 
only when those third parties in turn voluntarily divulge that information to 
law enforcement.25  That scenario rarely applies in the context in which law 
enforcement access to location data arises.  Finally, the Standards explicitly 
recommend additional procedural protections, such as notice, that the SCA 
does not currently provide and that courts engaged in constitutional analysis 
have so far neglected to discuss.26 
The article concludes that the Standards offer significant insights to 
legislators interested in updating the law to address location records.  
                                                                                                                 
 24. Stephen Wm. Smith, Standing Up for Mr. Nesbitt, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 257, 262 
(2012) (“So despite a pressing need for appellate court guidance to magistrate judges 
deluged with [ECPA] requests on a daily basis, almost none has been given.”).  I have 
argued that courts avoid engaging in necessary Fourth Amendment analysis of new 
communications technologies by engaging in short cuts, like the third party rule, because the 
constitutional inquiry requires a normative judgment that makes judges uncomfortable.  See 
Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, STAN. TECH. L. REV., June 
2007, at 3, ¶¶ 36-49 [hereinafter Freiwald, First Principles]; see also Susan Freiwald, The 
Davis Good Faith Rule and Getting Answers to the Questions Jones Left Open, 14 N.C. J. L. 
& TECH. 341 (2013) [hereinafter Freiwald, Good Faith Rule] (describing how lower courts 
have avoided constitutional analysis in the wake of the United States v. Jones decision by 
denying the exclusionary remedy). 
 25. See infra Part III.C. 
 26. See infra Part III.B.   
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Because the law applicable to location records could not be more muddled 
and the guidance provided by the appellate decisions today could not be 
less complete, the Standards have come at just the right time.27   
I. Federal Statutory Law on Location Records Cries Out for Clarification 
The Standards’ drafters recognize that technology and practices have far 
outstripped current law regarding law enforcement access to third party 
records.28  They also suggest that current law pertaining to location records 
represents a particularly worthy candidate for reform.  According to the 
Standards’ commentary, “application of the federal statutory law is . . .  
uncertain as it requires application of several unclear statutes.”29 
Under federal law, the SCA provides different procedural hurdles for 
different surveillance practices and establishes a sliding scale framework 
under which law enforcement may obtain apparently less private 
information more easily, while access to more private information faces a 
higher hurdle.30  The SCA requires law enforcement agents to make a 
showing of probable cause and obtain a warrant to acquire the most private 
information, such as the content of voicemails and emails.31  However, to 
acquire “record[s] or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or 
customer” other than content,32 law enforcement agents may make a lesser 
                                                                                                                 
     27. See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Historical 
Cell Site Information for Telephone Number [Redacted], No. 14-286 (JMF), 2014 WL 
1395082, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 17, 2014) [hereinafter D.C. Decision] (having “reviewed 
approximately eighty-seven opinions that are publicly available on Westlaw and that 
substantively address the legal issues surrounding [cell site location information],” the court 
found that “these decisions are impossible to reconcile”). 
 28. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 2, 5.  
 29. See STANDARD 25-4.1(d); see also In re Application of U.S. for an Order 
Authorizing the Disclosure of Cell Site Location Info., No. 6:08-6038M-REW, 2009 WL 
8231744, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 17, 2009) [hereinafter London Decision] (noting that 
“Congress has not directly spoken on the issue of [cell site location information] availability 
under the statutory melange presented,” which establishes “the need for clarification from 
lawmakers”); Henderson, supra note 4, at 818 (“The federal statutory law regarding law 
enforcement access to third-party location information is a mess . . . .”). 
 30. COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING 
AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 115-16 (3d. ed. 2009), available at  http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cyber 
crime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf. 
 31. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012).  In a series of complicated distinctions beyond the 
scope of this article, however, the statute allows access to some content without a warrant. 
Id. § 2703(b).   
 32. Id. § 2703(c). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/7
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showing under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (known as a D order).33  Congress 
designed the D order standard to be less burdensome to satisfy than the 
probable cause standard, but harder to meet than a mere relevance 
standard.34  The question is whether law enforcement agents may use a D 
order to obtain stored location information. 
While location data has no doubt proven useful in criminal 
investigations,35 its acquisition strongly implicates privacy concerns.36  In 
recognition of the latter and as a matter of state law, the highest courts of 
New Jersey and Massachusetts have now required agents to obtain a 
warrant based on probable cause before they may compel providers to 
divulge location records.37  Both decisions grounded their reasoning in their 
state constitutions, each of which reaches further to protect privacy than the 
Fourth Amendment.38  Both decisions vividly described the privacy 
interests in stored location records.  For example, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court recognized that “[w]ith increasing accuracy, cell phones can now 
trace our daily movements and disclose not only where individuals are 
located at a point in time but also which shops, doctors, religious services, 
and political events they go to, and with whom they choose to associate.”39  
According to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, “Even [location 
information] limited to the cell site locations of telephone calls made and 
received may yield a treasure trove of very detailed and extensive 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. § 2703(d).  Agents may apply under different provisions if they combine their 
request for location records with requests for other information.  COMPUTER CRIME & 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, supra note 30, at 127. 
 34. H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 31-32 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 
3511-12.  
 35. See Crump Statement, supra note 18, at 4-6; Freiwald, supra note 7, at 702-26; Pell 
& Soghoian, supra note 3, at 120-21.  
 36. See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 3, at 163-74 (cataloguing and assessing ways that 
judges describe the privacy and autonomy harms from government acquisition of location 
data).  
 37. Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 255 (Mass. 2014) (finding a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-phone location information); State v. Earls, 70 
A.3d 630, 643 (N.J. 2013) (same). 
 38. See Augustine, 467 Mass. at 244 (recognizing that the Massachusetts Constitution 
provides more protection of third party records than the Constitution); Earls, 70 A.3d at 632 
(“Historically, the State Constitution has offered greater protection to New Jersey residents 
than the Fourth Amendment.”); see also id. at 642 (explaining that New Jersey rejects the 
third party rule).  
 39. Earls, 70 A.3d at 632; see also id. at 642 (“[D]etails about the location of a cell 
phone can provide an intimate picture of one’s daily life.”); Augustine, 467 Mass. at 248 
(approving of and quoting from Earls). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
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information about the individual’s ‘comings and goings’ in both public and 
private places.”40  At the same time, state legislatures have recognized the 
threat to privacy and either passed or proposed state laws to require 
warrants for access to stored location data.41  Despite an emerging trend 
towards a warrant requirement for location data under state law,42 many 
magistrate judges have approved D orders for the compelled disclosure of 
location records, on both statutory and constitutional grounds.43   
In several recent cases, however, magistrate judges have rejected 
applications requesting D orders for location records, holding that agents 
needed to make a showing of probable cause.44  The government appealed 
two such cases; it appealed one from the Western District of Pennsylvania45 
(Pittsburgh Decision) to the Third Circuit and one from the Southern 
District of Texas46  (Houston Decision) to the Fifth Circuit.47  The decisions 
of the magistrates and of the appellate courts highlight the difficulties of 
interpretation that the SCA poses.  
The Pittsburgh Decision raised significant questions about the SCA’s 
coverage.  In particular, Magistrate Judge Lenihan, who authored the 
Pittsburgh Decision, questioned whether § 2703(c), the SCA’s records 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See Augustine, 467 Mass. at 251 (finding it significant that location information 
covering a span of two weeks apparently took up at least sixty-four pages of material). 
 41. See supra note 21; see also Hanni Fakhoury, New Massachusetts Decision Requires 
a Warrant for Cell Tracking, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.eff.org/ 
deeplinks/2014/02/massachusetts-requires-warrants-cell-tracking (describing pending state 
bills to require warrants for location records). 
 42. See Fakhoury, supra note 41. 
 43. See, e.g., United States v. Ruby, No. 12CR1073 WQH, 2013 WL 544888, at *4-*6 
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013); United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, at 405-06 (D. Md. 
2012); United States v. Gordon, No. 09-153-02 (RMU), 2012 WL 8499876, at *2 (D.D.C. 
Feb. 6, 2012); United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 
4200156 (N.D. Ga Apr. 21, 2008); see also Pell & Soghoian, supra note 3, at 143 (“Lower 
courts have, for the most part, accepted the government’s use of a D Order to compel 
historical cell site information.”). 
 44. See infra Part II.C. 
 45. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. 
to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 586 n.7 (W.D. Pa. 2008) [hereinafter 
Pittsburgh Decision], vacated, Third Cir. Decision, supra note 20.  
 46. In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 846 
(S.D. Tex. 2010) [hereinafter Houston Decision] (finding warrantless acquisition of 
historical cell site location information to violate the Fourth Amendment), vacated, Fifth Cir. 
Decision, supra note 20.  
 47. In each case, the district court affirmed the Magistrate Judge decision with little to 
no analysis.  Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 606 n.6; Third Cir. Decision, supra note 
20, at 306 n.1. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/7
2014]        HOW THE LEATPR STANDARDS GUIDE LEGISLATORS 883 
 
 
provision, includes location records.48  Both decisions also questioned 
whether a D Order furnished the appropriate legal hurdle for law 
enforcement agents to overcome before they may compel the disclosure of 
location records,49 which is a question that the appellate courts did not 
clearly resolve.  Finally, both decisions raised a troubling and persistent 
question: Must the information in a location record already be stored at the 
time the government requests it?   
A. Does § 2703(c) Cover Location Records? 
As mentioned, the SCA provides greater protection for the content of 
communications than for non-content information.  The distinction derives 
from the 1979 case of Smith v. Maryland in which the Supreme Court found 
no Fourth Amendment interest implicated when law enforcement agents 
determined the numbers a target had dialed on his telephone.50  It would 
have been a clear Fourth Amendment violation to obtain the content of his 
phone call without obtaining a court order based on probable cause and 
other requirements.51  One could argue that, because data about the 
locations one has been indicates so much information about one’s life, 
courts should view it as content data under the SCA.52  
No courts have pursued that line of interpretation, however, so it remains 
a stretch.  Currently, if the SCA applies, then location information would 
count as non-content information, and records of it would be available, if at 
all, under § 2703(c).  Most courts to address the issue have assumed that § 
2703(c) covers location records.53   
In contrast, the Pittsburgh Decision found that § 2703(c) did not even 
pertain to location records.54  In her decision, which all of the other 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Pittsburgh Decision, supra note 45, at 604-07.  
 49. Houston Decision, supra note 46, at 845-46; Pittsburgh Decision, supra note 45, at 
608-09. 
 50. 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979). 
 51. See id. at 739, 743 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).  
 52. See Freiwald, supra note 7, at 742 (discussing constitutional protection of location 
data and recognizing that courts sometimes characterize data as “content” after they 
determine that it requires protection, rather than determining protection based on a prior 
characterization). 
 53. See D.C. Decision, supra note 27, at *2 (discussing the issue); Houston Decision, 
supra note 46, at 830 n.6 (collecting cases). 
 54. See Pittsburgh Decision, supra note 45, at 601-07.   
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magistrate judges in the district joined,55 Magistrate Judge Lenihan 
described location records as information that a “tracking device” creates.56  
Congress defined mobile tracking devices broadly to include “an electronic 
or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a 
person or object.”57  It makes sense to view a cell phone as a tracking 
device when it creates a record of its user’s movements from place to place, 
as cell phones do when they generate location records.58  But the applicable 
definition of electronic communications explicitly excludes 
communications from a tracking device.59  In the Pittsburgh Decision, 
Magistrate Judge Lenihan reasoned that the tracking device exclusion from 
the definition of electronic communication necessarily meant that stored 
tracking device information should be excluded from the scope of records 
pertaining to an electronic communication service.60  On appeal, the Third 
Circuit rejected Judge Lenihan’s analysis; both the government and the 
amici who addressed the statutory issues agreed that § 2703(c) covered 
location records.61 
Although the legislative history has little to say about cell phones, and 
nothing to say about location data, it does establish that “the information 
involved is information about the customer’s use of the service.”62  In 
another decision, Judge Smith, the author of the Houston opinion, squarely 
rejected the idea that prospective location data could be covered as a record 
under § 2703(c).  Judge Smith reasoned that prospective cell site data 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See Third Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 308 (“This is unique in the author’s 
experience of more than three decades on this court and demonstrates the impressive level of 
support Magistrate Judge Lenihan’s opinion has among her colleagues . . . .”). 
 56. Pittsburgh Decision, supra note 45, at 589, 601-07.  
 57. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (2012).  Unfortunately, this provision does not indicate the 
procedures law enforcement agents must follow to obtain records created by tracking 
devices. 
 58. Pittsburgh Decision, supra note 45, at 602 (“[I]t is, therefore, extremely difficult to 
see how a cell phone is not now precisely [a tracking device].”). 
 59. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(c) (2012). 
 60. Pittsburgh Decision, supra note 45, at 604; see also In re Application of U.S. for an 
Order Authorizing Use of a Pen Register with Caller Identification Device Cell Site 
Location Auth. on a Cellular Tel., 2009 WL 159187, at *3, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2009) 
(coming to the same conclusion). 
 61. See Third Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 307-08 (“[T]here is no dispute that 
historical [location data] . . . falls within the scope of § 2703(c)(1).”); see also id. at 310 
(finding it irrelevant that location data may be information from a tracking device because it 
derives from a wire communication). 
 62. S. Dist. Tex. Decision, supra note 15, at 758 (citing S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 38 
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3592). 
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appears to be unrelated to any customer (as opposed to law enforcement) 
use of the provider’s services because subscribers do not use the phone to 
track their own movements in real time.63  Judge Smith went on to suggest 
that historical location information could count because “[c]ell phone 
companies might legitimately compile such data for customized marketing 
and billing purposes.”64  That analysis raises the question of whether 
location data compiled for law-enforcement use rather than related to 
customer use would fall outside the scope of § 2703(c).  I return to that 
issue below.65 
In a more recent decision, Magistrate Judge Facciola from the District of 
Columbia renewed the question by considering the different ways location 
data may be generated.66  Judge Facciola explained that location data 
associated with a wire communication would not be subject to the tracking 
device exclusion applicable to electronic communications.  On the other 
hand, if a provider gives location data to the government generated through 
“sending and receiving text messages, using applications like Facebook and 
Twitter, checking e-mails, or using the GPS function on the phone,” then 
that information could fall outside the SCA’s scope. 67   
In summary, as Magistrate Judge Lenihan did, a judge could construe 
location records to fall outside the coverage of § 2703(c).  The judge could 
view location data as content information, as information from a tracking 
device and therefore not an electronic communication, or as information 
unrelated to a customer’s use of a provider’s services.  Judge Lenihan 
assumed that if the SCA does not cover location records, the background 
rule of Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 41, requiring notice to the target (at some point) 
and a warrant based on probable cause, would apply to government 
demands for them.68  That seems right, unless one can successfully establish 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Id. at 759. 
 64. Id. at 759 n.16. 
 65. See infra text accompanying notes 162-77. 
 66. See D.C. Decision, supra note 27, at *2.  See infra text accompanying notes 103-
108 for a discussion of the different ways location data may be generated. 
 67. See D.C. Decision, supra note 27, at *2.  Judge Facciola indicated that he could not 
decide on the government’s applications without a better understanding of the provider’s 
practices and the exact location information they would furnish to the government, which 
could well differ from the information the government requested.  Id. at *3; see also 
Freiwald, supra note 7, at 716-20 (noting that the government has emphasized its narrow 
requests for location data but that providers’ disclosures will reflect their costs and will not 
likely be circumscribed without a court order requiring that).   
 68. Pittsburgh Decision, supra note 45, at 607; see also Third Cir. Decision, supra note 
20, at 309 (same). 
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that acquisition of location records raises no Fourth Amendment concerns.69  
As Part II argues, current federal appellate interpretations have made that 
question entirely opaque.  Before turning to that question, I consider the 
debate over the procedural hurdle the SCA requires for records covered by 
§ 2703(c).  
B. Does a D Order Suffice for Access to Location Records Under the SCA? 
By interpreting § 2703(c) in conflicting ways, courts have sown 
confusion for anyone trying to understand the law and given mixed 
direction to magistrate judges about how to rule on government 
applications.  Section 2703(c) permits “governmental entit[ies]” to  
require a provider of electronic communication service or remote 
computing service to disclose a record or other information 
pertaining to a subscriber of customer of such service (not 
including the contents of communications) only when the 
governmental entity —   
 (A) obtains a warrant . . .  
 (B) obtains a [D Order]; 
 (C) has the consent of the subscriber or customer to such 
disclosure;  
 (D) [is investigating telemarketing fraud]; or 
 (E) [seeks certain limited information not including location 
data].70   
In cases not involving consent, the only available routes to obtain 
location data the provisions leave open are satisfaction of either the D order 
standard or the probable cause standard.71  Which path magistrate judges 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Cf. Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap 
Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 69-74 (2004) (discussing how to treat government acquisition of 
online information, such as web browsing data and search terms, not clearly covered by the 
current statutory categories and disagreeing with Professor Orin Kerr that the presumption 
should be that such information lacks any protection (citing Orin S. Kerr, Internet 
Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 607, 645-47 (2003))).  If one considered location data the product of a tracking device, 
one could require a warrant for installation of the tracking device, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3117, as Magistrate Judge Lenihan suggested.  See Pittsburgh Decision, supra note 45, at 
613-14. 
 70. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (2012).   
 71. Provisions (D) and (E) do not apply to the investigations this Article considers.   
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may require agents to navigate turns out to be subject to significant 
disagreement. 
1. Require a Warrant 
Judge Dennis, the dissenting judge on the Fifth Circuit panel that decided 
the appeal from the Houston Decision, interpreted the SCA in a way that 
would have been straightforward and easy to apply.  Judge Dennis viewed 
the SCA as ambiguous, but would have held that “subsection 2703(c)(1)(A) 
applies to historical cell site location records, such that the statute requires 
the government to ‘obtain[] a warrant’ to compel their disclosure.”72  Judge 
Dennis found the warrant procedure appropriate under the principle of 
constitutional avoidance, because “non-consensual, warrantless compulsion 
of cell site location records raises serious and debatable constitutional 
questions,” which courts could avoid by requiring a warrant.73  Though 
Judge Dennis’ opinion discussed at length how law enforcement’s access to 
location records could impinge on users’ privacy interests,74 he emphasized 
that he based his holding on statutory interpretation.75  Were that holding 
the law, magistrate judges would know to require a warrant whenever law 
enforcement agents sought to acquire any location data from a provider.  As 
a dissent, however, it does not bind lower courts. 
2. Require a D Order 
Executive branch litigators have consistently advocated that magistrate 
judges must grant orders to compel providers to disclose location records 
whenever law enforcement agents make the statutory showing for D 
orders.76  To obtain a D order, an agent must submit an application that 
“offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the . . . information sought [is] relevant and material 
to an ongoing criminal investigation.”77  As mentioned above, the D order 
standard is easier to meet than probable cause, which courts generally 
interpret to require “a showing of a fair probability of evidence of criminal 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 630 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id. at 632 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. at 622-24.  See infra Part II for a discussion of the appellate courts’ 
constitutional analysis. 
 75.  Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 617 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“I would affirm 
on statutory grounds the order denying the government’s [D Order] application with respect 
to historical cell site location data.”). 
 76. See, e.g., Third Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 315.  
 77. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).  
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activity.”78  As the next Part will discuss, if users have a Fourth 
Amendment interest that law enforcement agents intrude upon when they 
compel the disclosure of location records, then a D order alone does not 
satisfy the Fourth Amendment, but a warrant based on probable cause likely 
would.79 
The government has often succeeded in promoting its view in the lower 
courts.  Several magistrate judges have written opinions agreeing that a D 
order showing suffices for government access to location records.80  In each 
case, these courts have found that the government does not intrude on 
users’ Fourth Amendment interests when it compels the disclosure of 
location records, so Congress is free to legislate whatever requirements it 
chooses.81  Then, as a matter of statutory interpretation, these courts have 
accepted the government’s position that Congress has directed magistrate 
judges to grant D orders compelling location records disclosure whenever 
agents meet the statutory showing and never to require more.82  While this 
approach also offers a clear path for lower court judges, albeit one that is 
less protective of privacy, it has not yet received an imprimatur from an 
appellate court.83 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Pittsburgh Decision, supra note 45, at 585 n.1; see generally Freiwald, supra note 7, 
at 696-98 (discussing the practical differences between the two standards, including that the 
D order showing permits access to information about people who are not themselves 
suspected of crimes). 
 79. See infra Part II.  Notice to the target may be required as well.  See In re Application 
of U.S. for & [sic] Order: (1) Authorizing Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device; (2) 
Authorizing Release of Subscriber & Other Info.; & (3) Authorizing Disclosure of Location-
Based Servs., 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 580-81 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (explaining that Rule 41 is not 
satisfied if the government fails to provide notice to the target (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 
41(f)(2)(C))). 
 80. See supra note 43.  A few district courts have even reversed magistrate judges who 
required a probable cause showing.  See In re Application of U.S. for an Order: (1) 
Authorizing Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, & (2) Authorizing 
Release of Subscriber & Other Info., 622 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D. Tex. 2007); In re 
Applications of U.S. for an Order Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. 
Supp. 2d 76 (D. Mass. 2007). 
 81. See, e.g., United States v. Benford, No. 2:09 CR 86, 2010 WL 1266507, at *3 (N.D. 
Ind. Mar. 26, 2010). 
 82. See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 
830 F. Supp. 2d 114, 147-48 (E.D. Va. 2011). 
 83. One appellate court has affirmed that location data does not impinge on Fourth 
Amendment privacy interests, but did not address compelled disclosure to records because 
the case concerned real time access to location information.  United States v. Skinner, 690 
F.3d 772, 779 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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The Fifth Circuit and Third Circuit accepted neither straightforward view 
of the statute.  As the next two subsections describe, the Third Circuit 
adopts a complicated balancing scheme that leaves magistrate judges 
largely in the dark about how to proceed.  The Fifth Circuit’s approach 
covers a small subset of location data and gives little direction about the 
vast amount of data it leaves unaddressed.  Surely lower courts could use an 
update to the law to light the way forward. 
3. Permit Magistrate Judges to Choose to Require a Warrant 
According to the Third Circuit majority, a showing under the D order 
standard provides a necessary but not sufficient condition for the granting 
of an order to compel the disclosure of location records.84  The majority 
based the statutory construction argument on the text of § 2703(d), which 
contains the following language:   
A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be 
issued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and 
shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and 
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the . . . records . . . are relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.85   
Because Congress used the phrase “only if” instead of “if” before the 
specific and articulable facts language, and because Congress indicated that 
courts “may” issue D orders instead of “shall” issue such orders, the Third 
Circuit held that “the statute as presently written gives [magistrate judges] 
the option to require a warrant showing probable cause” before granting an 
order to compel the disclosure of location records.86  The opinion cautioned 
that magistrate judges should exercise the option to require a warrant 
“sparingly” because, while Congress explicitly included the D order option, 
the court derived the warrant option from Congress’ failure to explicitly say 
that it was not available.87 
The Third Circuit majority gave magistrate judges, including Judge 
Lenihan, who had authored the Pittsburgh Decision, precious little guidance 
on how to choose which standard to impose.  The opinion devoted a few 
pages to considering the Fourth Amendment interests implicated by 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Third Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 316-20; see also Fifth Cir. Decision, supra 
note 20, at 606-07. 
 85. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). 
 86. Third Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 319. 
 87. Id. 
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compelled disclosure of location records,88 but came to no conclusions.  
The court did direct Judge Lenihan, if she decided to require a warrant on 
remand, to “make fact findings and give a full explanation that balances the 
Government’s need (not merely desire) for the information with the privacy 
interests of cell phone users.”89  The Third Circuit majority imposed a 
significant burden on Judge Lenihan,90 in particular, and on magistrate 
judges, in general.  According to the Third Circuit, magistrate judges who 
receive D Orders for location records are to engage in a balancing process 
that neither Congress nor the appellate court was willing to undertake.91  
Other appellate court judges have indicated significant concerns about 
according magistrate judges that much responsibility.  Judge Tashima, the 
concurring judge on the Third Circuit panel, described the majority’s 
approach as “vest[ing] magistrate judges with arbitrary and uncabined 
discretion to grant or deny issues of § 2703(d) orders at the whim of the 
magistrate.”92  In his amicus submission to the Fifth Circuit, Professor Orin 
Kerr argued that magistrate judges lack authority under Article III to issue 
the constitutional analysis that the Third Circuit opinion requires.93   
                                                                                                                 
 88. Id. at 310-13; see also infra Part III. 
 89. Third Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 319. 
 90. Judge Lenihan never got a chance to issue an opinion on remand because the 
government moved to withdraw its application almost one year after the Third Circuit 
Decision.  Motion to Seal, In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of 
Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, No. 2:07-mj-00524-TFM-LPL 
(W.D. Pa. July 28, 2011), ECF No. 39.  Judge Lenihan granted the government’s request to 
withdraw its application, but denied its request to do so under seal.  In re Application of U.S. 
for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 
No. 2:07-mj-00524-TFM-LPL (W.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2011).   
 91. Third Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 319 (“[W]e are stymied by the failure of 
Congress to make its intention [regarding whether to require a warrant] clear.”); id. at 320 
(Tashima, J., concurring) (complaining that the majority’s interpretation “provides no 
standards for the approval or disapproval for an application for an order under § 2703(d)”). 
 92. Id. at 320 (Tashima, J., concurring). 
 93. Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor Orin S. Kerr in Support of the Appellant in Favor 
of Reversal, Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20 (No. 4:11-MC-00223), 2012 WL 10205105, 
at 12-16; see also Orin Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA. L. 
REV. 1241, 1260-77 (2010).  But see Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 604 n.4 (finding 
no constitutional problem because district courts review magistrate judges’ opinions de 
novo); Smith, supra note 24, at 266 (countering that magistrate judges have to stand up to 
protect citizens’ rights in the face of intrusive surveillance).  For more on the Fifth Circuit’s 
discussion of the procedural questions Professor Kerr posed in his amicus brief, see Recent 
Case, Fourth Amendment-Warrantless Searches-Fifth Circuit Upholds Stored 
Communications Act’s Nonwarrant Requirement for Cell-Site Data as Not Per Se 
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If and when Congress heeds calls to update or revise how federal 
statutory law regulates law enforcement requests to compel the disclosure 
of location records,94 it will look to the guidance appellate courts provide.  
Legislators will certainly pay attention to those courts’ analysis of the 
applicable constitutional provisions.  I turn to those analyses in Part II.  
First though, I consider how the Fifth Circuit’s approach to the statutory 
question raised as many (or more) questions as it answered. 
4. Require a D Order for a Small Subset of Data 
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the Third Circuit and interpreted § 
2703(c) to require that courts grant applications for D Orders to obtain 
disclosure of location records whenever the government “meets the 
‘specific and articulable facts’ standard.”95  At first glance, the decision’s 
language appears consistent with the government’s argument that 
magistrate judges have no discretion to deny such applications.96   
But a closer look reveals that the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, like the Third 
Circuit’s, actually leaves considerable leeway to magistrate judges, with 
precious little guidance.  It accomplished that by first narrowing the scope 
of its inquiry.  At the outset, the Fifth Circuit read the lower court’s opinion 
as concluding that the D order provision “was categorically unconstitutional 
with respect to an entire class of records [i.e., location records].”97  The 
court then determined that “we are only asked to decide whether every 
instance of one particular factual circumstance—§ 2703(d) orders for 
historical cell site information—is unconstitutional.”98   
The Fifth Circuit’s reading of the Houston Decision seems particularly 
uncharitable for what was effectively an as-applied challenge to the 
statute.99  And, by strongly rejecting the idea that location data should be 
                                                                                                                 
Unconstitutional-In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Cite Data, 724 
F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013), 127 HARV. L. REV. 1220, 1222 (2014). 
 94. See, e.g., Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 615 (recommending that cell phone 
users lobby their “elected representatives to enact statutory protections”). 
 95. Id. at 607. 
 96. See id. (“[T]he court does not have the discretion to refuse to grant the order.”); id. 
at 607 n.8 (“The text of the statute shows that Congress does not want magistrate judges 
second-guessing its calculus.”). 
 97. Id. at 603-04. 
 98. Id. at 604. 
 99. It was as-applied in the sense that Judge Smith based his holding on the facts of the 
application before him, as well as extensive judicial fact finding about location data in 
general.  See Houston Decision, supra note 46, at 831-35.  It was not actually a challenge 
because, like all cases involving location records requests, it arose as a result of an ex parte 
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treated as a single category, the opinion raises important questions about 
how to further categorize location data for purposes of any future privacy 
statute.  Most important at this point in the discussion, however, is that the 
Fifth Circuit disposed of the case by finding that a limited subset of the 
information the government sought could be obtained under the D order 
standard and by not addressing the rest. 
The Fifth Circuit opined that D orders to obtain location records “for 
specified cell phones at the points at which the user places and terminates a 
call are not categorically unconstitutional.”100  The majority admitted that in 
some cases, law enforcement acquisition of even initiation and termination 
records that pertain only to the target’s calls may implicate constitutional 
interests: “If we conclude that such orders are not categorically 
unconstitutional, specific orders within that category certainly may be 
unconstitutional because of additional facts involved in the case.  But we do 
not need such facts to determine if orders for historical cell site records are 
per se unconstitutional.”101  In so holding, the Fifth Circuit reversed the 
lower court’s decision on an extremely narrow ground, but gave little 
guidance as to when a D order would be sufficient to obtain historical 
records.   
The majority opinion explicitly excluded from its coverage orders that 
request the following: location data pertaining to calls made by the recipient 
of calls from the target, location data about sites used during a call (duration 
data), location data about sites used when a phone is idle (idle state or 
registration data), and GPS data.102  The decision did not explicitly exclude 
location data obtained when a cell phone receives calls, sends or receives a 
text message or otherwise accesses the internet, but its holding certainly did 
not cover it either.   
                                                                                                                 
application by the government.  The district court’s affirmance of Judge Smith’s decision 
was more sweeping in scope.  See In re Applications of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 
No. 4:11-MC-00223, slip op. at *1 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 11, 2011) (holding, without further 
specification, that “data disclosing the location of the telephone at the time of particular calls 
may be acquired only by a warrant issue on probable cause” and that “[t]he standard under 
the [SCA D Order] is below that required by the Constitution”).  
 100. Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 615. 
 101. Id. at 604. 
 102. Id. at 615; cf. State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 637 (2013) (“Cell phones can be tracked 
when they are used to make a call, send a text message, or connect to the Internet—or when 
they take no action at all, so long as the phone is not turned off.”) (citing ECPA Reform & 
the Revolution in Location Based Techs. & Servs.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Const., Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 13-14 
(2010) (statement of Matt Blaze, Professor, Univ. of Pa.)).  
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All of the explicitly or implicitly excluded types of location data are 
capable of storage by providers and therefore susceptible to acquisition 
through compelled disclosure by law enforcement agents. For example, 
Judge Smith noted in the Houston Decision that the government’s 
applications had specifically requested location data for the times when the 
target receives a call, as well as duration data and idle state (registration) 
data.103  The government has applied for and apparently received such data 
in other cases.104  The Third Circuit opinion noted that the application in the 
case at hand requested GPS data and that the DOJ’s application template 
has a place to request GPS data when requesting location data.105  One of 
the other cases that required probable cause for access to location data 
reported that the government’s application had requested the location data 
recorded every time the target sent and received text messages.106  As 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Houston Decision, supra note 46, at 829 (quoting the applications to request “the 
cellsite/sector(s) used by the mobile telephone to obtain service for a call or when in an idle 
state”); see also id. (“In other words, the Government seeks continuous location data to track 
the target phone over a two month period, whether the phone was in active use or not.”); 
Application at 3, Houston Decision, supra note 46 (No. 4:10-mj-00998) (seeking location 
data for the origin, termination, and, if reasonably available, during the duration of the call).  
Although the Fifth Circuit indicated that the government was willing to exclude idle state 
data from the scope of its applications, Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 602 n.1, there is 
no record of its amending its application to do so.  It may be that Judge Smith should refuse 
to grant any order the government resubmits if it continues to request duration or idle state 
data because that would exceed the scope of what the Fifth Circuit sanctioned.  
 104. See, e.g., United States v. Benford, No. 2:09 CR 86, 2010 WL 1266507, at *1 (N.D. 
Ind. Mar. 26, 2010) (describing information sought as data “identifying which cell tower 
communicated with the cell phone while it was turned on”); London Decision, supra note 
29, at *1 (quoting application as requesting “cell site activations at call origination for 
outbound calls, at call termination for incoming calls, and, if reasonably available, during 
both outbound and incoming calls”); Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 239 (D. 
Mass. 2014) (noting that location information was associated with “calls made and received 
by the defendant’s cellular telephone handset—including . . . unanswered calls—as well as 
the latitude and longitude of the cell sites to which those calls connected in order to conduct 
those calls”).  The government has refused to disclose the actual location information it 
received, so it is difficult to know what was actually produced.  See, e.g., id. at 268 n.12 
(describing how the Massachusetts Supreme Court gave up its request to review the sixty-
four pages of location information at issue when the government objected to its disclosure). 
 105. Third Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 311 (noting that the Government’s sample 
application for a D Order for location records specifically requests GPS data and that, 
although the Government disclaimed interest in obtaining GPS data, “the Government does 
not argue that it cannot or will not request information from a GPS device through a § 
2703(d) order”). 
 106. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-Site 
Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 578 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) [hereinafter Brooklyn I Decision]; see also 
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mentioned above, Judge Facciola recently discussed the possibility that 
users generate location data by sending e-mail, surfing the web and using 
social media.107  Technical experts have confirmed that mobile devices 
communicate with cell towers whenever they download data, and that 
carriers log such communications in databases.108  
By concluding that it is not per se unacceptable for a court to require a 
provider to disclose the smallest subset of location data, the Fifth Circuit 
failed to guide magistrate judges about the great bulk of current and 
pending location data requests.  The need for legislation could not be 
greater.  While Congress is at it, it should also determine whether records 
must record only past information. 
C. Location Records for Future Data? 
The SCA’s legislative history offers no guide to what Congress meant to 
include in § 2703(c).  In 1986, when the SCA was passed, Congress was 
conscious of only the first developments in the cell phone industry.109  
There were hardly any cell towers at the time, and cell phones themselves 
were almost prohibitively expensive.110  Since then, Americans have 
integrated cell phone use into their daily lives to an astonishing degree.111  
Yet, Congress has done nothing to clarify the standards applicable to 
government acquisition of location data.112 
The Fifth Circuit litigation revealed that the government does not view 
location records as containing solely historical information.  In its 
applications to Judge Smith, the government requested that the targeted 
                                                                                                                 
In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 
F. Supp. 2d 113, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) [hereinafter Brooklyn II Decision] (ruling on a 
resubmission of the application by the government for the same information). 
 107. See D.C. Decision, supra note 27, at *3.   
 108. See supra note 102; see also Pell & Soghoian, supra note 3, at 128. 
 109. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1-2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556.  
 110. See CTIA—THE WIRELESS ASS’N, SEMI-ANNUAL WIRELESS INDUSTRY SURVEY 2 
(2013), available at http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Survey_YE_2012_Graphics-FINAL.pdf 
(reporting 1,531 cell sites in June of 1986, compared to 301,779 in 2012); Frank Vizard, 
Phones on a Roll, POPULAR MECHANICS, Jan. 1986, at 95, 95 (describing the cost of car 
model cell phones as ranging from $1000 to $3000).  
 111. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 34-36 (D.D.C. 2013) (documenting 
tremendous growth in the cell phone industry over the last decade and the changes in the 
way we use mobile phones). 
 112. See Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 628 n.11 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 106-932, at 
17 (2000)) (acknowledging a continued lack of clear legal standards for government 
collection of location data). 
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providers deliver records covering the past sixty days of location data.113  In 
addition, the government asked for an order that required the providers to 
collect and store location information in the future, and to forward those 
newly created records, upon receipt and storage, to the requesting law 
enforcement agency on an ongoing basis.114  In one application in 
particular, the applying agent asked for such future-created records under 
the sole authority of § 2703(c),115 which covers only “a record or other 
information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of [an electronic 
communication service].”116  
Reviewing courts have rejected the idea that § 2703(c) may be used to 
obtain prospective location information.117  They have found that location 
records, which provide “historical” location information, must be in the 
provider’s possession at the time the order is made.118  That interpretation 
accords with the consensus among academics, that the SCA covers 
“retrospective surveillance” only.119  It also appeals to common sense: when 
one obtains a record of something in storage, that item should already be 
recorded in storage.  The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board came 
to the same conclusion when it interpreted a statute permitting access to 
telephone calling “records” to require those records to exist at the time the 
                                                                                                                 
 113.  See, e.g., Application at 2, Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20 (No. 4:10-mj-00981). 
 114. Brief of Amicus Curiae Susan Freiwald in Support of Affirmance, Fifth Cir. 
Decision, supra note 20 (No. 11-20884), 2012 WL 10205104, at 5-7 [hereinafter Freiwald 
Brief]. 
 115. Application at 3 n.5, Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20 (No. 4:10-mj-00998).  
 116. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2012). 
 117. See, e.g., United States v. Espudo, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035-37 (S.D. Ca. 2013) 
(declining to treat location information as a record under the SCA despite government’s 
argument that providers store the information, even for a few seconds, before transmitting 
it); London Decision, supra note 29, at *3, *8 (“The SCA has no prospective application.”).  
 118. See, e.g., Brooklyn I Decision, supra note 106, at 579 n.1; London Decision, supra 
note 29, at *3; see also ECPA Reform & the Revolution in Location Based Techs. & Servs.: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const., Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 86, 86 n.25 (2010) (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. 
Mag. J.). 
 119. See, e.g., Kevin S. Bankston, Only the DOJ Knows: The Secret Law of Electronic 
Surveillance, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 589, 608 (2007); Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet 
Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 
HASTINGS L.J. 805, 815 & n.53 (2003); Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in 
Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1567 (2004).  
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government requested them and not to permit telephone companies to 
provide newly generated records on a daily basis to the NSA.120   
Whether the government may obtain real-time information as records 
under § 2703(c) matters if it is easier to get records than real-time 
information.  If the government’s view of the statute is correct, and it may 
compel the disclosure of records pursuant to a D order, then that is easier to 
obtain than what courts have required for access to real-time location 
data—either warrants or hybrid orders of D orders plus pen register 
orders.121  Particularly in jurisdictions that require warrants for access to 
real-time location data, government agents may take advantage of the 
confusion around whether “records” can include instantaneously created 
records on an ongoing basis and circumvent the warrant requirement.122  
One court labelled as subterfuge attempts to “misuse” the SCA to get 
“freshly-created records” of location data as an “end-run around the legal 
limits on real-time access.”123  Perhaps that explains the government’s 
applications to Judge Smith, who had written several opinions explaining 
why he requires a warrant based on probable cause for government access 
to real-time location data.124  
The government’s ability to take advantage of the lower protection for 
historical data as compared to real-time location data adds urgency to the 
question of whether the two types of data should be treated the same in any 
                                                                                                                 
 120. See PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE 
RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE 
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 81-87 (2014), available at 
http://www.pclob.gov/All%20Documents/Report%20on%20the%20Telephone%20Records%2
0Program/PCLOB-Report-on-the-Telephone-Records-Program.pdf (interpreting section 215 of 
the Patriot Act). 
 121. A pen register order requires a government attorney only to certify to the court that 
the “information likely to be obtained . . . is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 
18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1) (2012).  Because it is so easy to get a pen register order, a hybrid 
order should not be much harder to obtain than a D Order alone, but a warrant would be 
harder to obtain. 
 122. See, e.g., Espudo, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 1034 (refusing to permit the Government to 
convert an application for real-time location data into one for records by claiming that the 
provider held the records “however briefly” before delivering them).  
 123. London Decision, supra note 29, at *10 n.15; see also Espudo, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 
1037 (observing that “taking the Government’s argument that real-time cell site location data 
is an historical record to its logical end” could lead to the government trying to use the 
easier-to-satisfy requirements of the SCA to avoid the legal constraints on wiretapping).  
 124. See infra text accompanying notes 165-67 for a discussion of how the Fifth Circuit 
decision declined to address prospective records questions by narrowing the scope of its 
inquiry. 
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case.125  Both Judge Smith and Judge Lenihan discussed at length how it 
makes little sense to view an investigation into historical location data as 
less intrusive than one involving real-time data.126  Other magistrate judges 
have agreed,127 as have several academic commentators.128  Congress will 
need to consider those arguments when and if it decides to legislate.  For 
now, the lack of clear legal rules to address challenging practices adds yet 
more weight to the case for doing so. 
II. Appellate Cases Provide Conflicting and Limited Guidance on 
Constitutional Law  
The LEATPR Standards’ drafters recognize that any legislature 
interested in drafting provisions for law enforcement access to third party 
records will want to consult existing law129 and also ensure that anything it 
drafts satisfies constitutional requirements.130  Part I elaborated on how the 
confusing and incomplete nature of existing federal statutory law on 
compelled access to location records made it a great candidate for 
legislative action.  This Part explains how the Fifth Circuit and Third 
Circuit decisions provide Congress poor guidance on how the Fourth 
                                                                                                                 
 125. See, e.g., Espudo, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 1035 (describing the Government’s contention, 
at oral argument, “that there is no cognizable difference between historical and real-time cell 
site location data”). 
 126. Houston Decision, supra note 46, at 839 (finding the “degree of invasiveness” the 
same “between prospective and historical location tracking”); Pittsburgh Decision, supra 
note 45, at 607 n.55. 
 127. See, e.g., Brooklyn I Decision, supra note 106, at 585 (“The picture of Tyshawn 
Augustus’s life the government seeks to obtain is no less intimate simply because it has 
already been painted.”); In re Applications of U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. 
Code, § 2703(d) to Disclose Subscriber Info. & Historic Cell Site Info. for Mobile 
Identification Nos.: (XXX) XXX-AAAA, (XXX) XXX-BBBB, & (XXX) XXX-CCCC, 509 
F. Supp. 2d 64, 74 (D. Mass. 2007) (noting that the same Fourth Amendment concerns apply 
to both prospective and historical tracking devices).  
 128. See, e.g., Freiwald, supra note 7, at 738-40; Henderson, supra note 4, at 831.  But 
see Pell & Soghoian, supra note 3 (arguing that, apart from policy and constitutional 
questions, Congress is not likely to pass a warrant standard for access to historical location 
data, so privacy advocates should accept a lower procedural hurdle along with other 
protections, like minimization, notice, and reporting, that protect privacy and provide 
transparency).  
 129. STANDARD 25-4.1(d) (recommending that legislatures consider the extent to which 
“existing law . . . restricts or allows access to and dissemination of such information or of 
comparable information”).  
 130. STANDARD 25-2.2 (“A legislature . . . may not authorize a protection less than that 
required by the federal Constitution . . . .”). 
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Amendment regulates location records, compounding the need for guidance 
from the Standards. 
A. Appellate Cases Disagree About Whether Targets Lack a Fourth 
Amendment Interest in Location Records Because a Third Party Stores 
Them 
The lower courts that have accepted the government’s claim that 
magistrate judges must grant D order applications for location records when 
they satisfy the reasonable and articulable facts standard have rejected 
users’ claims to a Fourth Amendment interest in their location data.  Often, 
courts have found users to have waived any Fourth Amendment privacy 
interest they might have had in their location data when they chose to share 
it with their providers.131  The courts call this a “third party rule,” drawn 
from the Supreme Court cases of Smith v. Maryland132 and United States v. 
Miller.133  In Smith, the Court denied the defendant’s claim that law 
enforcement agents violated the Fourth Amendment when, without first 
obtaining a warrant, they had the phone company install a pen register to 
record the telephone numbers the defendant’s phone dialed.134  In Miller, 
the Court rejected the defendant’s claim that agents had violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights when they compelled his bank to disclose his bank 
records, also without first obtaining a warrant.135  Applying the same 
assumption of risk analysis the Supreme Court used in Smith and Miller, 
lower courts have reasoned that the target of an investigation may not 
complain if his location data is divulged to law enforcement, when a third 
party (the provider) does the divulging.136  According to those courts, by 
permitting the provider access to his location data, a user has waived any 
expectation of privacy in that data.137 
Some courts and several scholars have criticized the extension of the 
third party doctrine from Smith and Miller, both of which the Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
 131. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 400 (D. Md. 2012); United 
States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156, at *8 (N.D. Ga. 
Apr. 21, 2008).  
 132. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 133. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 134. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-44. 
 135. Miller, 425 U.S. at 444-46. 
 136. See, e.g., Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 397-401.  See infra Part III.C for a discussion 
of how the Standards better distinguish between voluntary and compelled disclosure. 
 137. See, e.g., Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 401. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/7
2014]        HOW THE LEATPR STANDARDS GUIDE LEGISLATORS 899 
 
 
Court decided in the 1970s, into the modern age.138  The Sixth Circuit 
rejected the government’s attempted application of the doctrine to stored 
email in the 2010 Warshak case.139  The Sixth Circuit determined that the 
third party doctrine does not apply when the third parties are internet 
service providers (ISPs) who act as “intermediaries” when they deliver and 
store their customers’ emails, just as the postal service acts regarding mail 
and the phone company acts regarding phone calls.140  In December of 
2013, Judge Leon, in the District Court for the District of Columbia, 
similarly found that the Smith case simply did not apply, despite the 
government’s urging that it squarely governed the National Security 
Agency’s (NSA’s) metadata collection program.141  Recently, Justice 
Sotomayor explicitly criticized the third party doctrine in United States v. 
Jones,142 the 2012 case finding a Fourth Amendment search when law 
enforcement agents used a GPS device to obtain location data.143   
The Third Circuit Decision squarely rejected application of the third 
party doctrine to the location data context,144 while the Fifth Circuit 
Decision did not apply it to location data as directly and comprehensively 
as the government had pressed.145  Unfortunately for legal clarity, and just 
like with their statutory interpretation, the appellate court opinions neither 
                                                                                                                 
 138. See, e.g., Houston Decision, supra note 46, at 840-41; Patricia L. Bellia & Susan 
Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored E-mail, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 145-
56; Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third 
Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431, 434-47 (2013); Erin Murphy, The Case Against 
the Case For Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1239 (2009). 
 139. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 140. Id. at 286. 
 141. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30-37 (D.D.C. 2013).  But see ACLU v. 
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 751-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (applying Smith to uphold the NSA’s 
metadata program against Fourth Amendment challenge).  
 142. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 143. Id. at 950-51.  Because the GPS tracking device operated in real time, however, 
Jones was not a stored records case.  Freiwald, Good Faith Rule, supra note 24, at 352 
(casting doubt on the impact of Justice Sotomayor’s language).  Christopher Slobogin still 
regards Jones as a third party case because he views it as rejecting the idea that one loses 
privacy in information by exposing it outside to third parties.  See Christopher Slobogin, 
Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory 
Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 6-7, 7 n.30 (2012). 
 144. Third Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 317.  
 145. Compare Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 615, with Brief of United States at 
17-18, Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20 (No. 11-20884), 2012 WL 604860. 
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agreed with each other nor offered clear guidance to lower courts or 
legislators.  
According to the Third Circuit, the provider’s storage of the target’s 
location records did not obviate the target’s claim that warrantless 
compelled disclosure of those records violated her Fourth Amendment 
rights.146  The court reasoned that cell phone customers are not likely to be 
aware that their “providers collect and store historical location 
information.”147  The court found that users “‘voluntarily and knowingly’” 
convey only the numbers that they dial when they make cell phone calls 
and receive “‘no indication’” that “‘making [those] call[s] will also locate 
the caller[s].’”148  As a result, they do not assume the risk of disclosure 
under the third party doctrine. 
In its decision, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the third party doctrine by 
distinguishing the Warshak case.149  Unlike an ISP, which delivers the 
communications of two parties without itself being a party to those 
communications, the Fifth Circuit found that a “cell service provider 
collects and stores historical cell site data for its own business purposes, 
perhaps to monitor or optimize service on its network or to accurately bill 
its customers for the segments of its network that they use.”150  Because 
providers are parties to the transactions that create location records, the 
Fifth Circuit found that such records are business records that lack Fourth 
Amendment protection under the third party doctrine of Smith and Miller.151   
Coming six months earlier, the Fifth Circuit did not address Judge 
Leon’s argument in Klayman that compelled disclosure of location data was 
not analogous to the installation of a pen register in Smith v. Maryland.152  
Judge Leon engaged in extensive analysis of how much information users 
reveal through use of their cell phones and how extensive location data may 
therefore be.153  That analysis recalled the Houston Decision, in which 
Judge Smith colorfully concluded, “If the telephone numbers dialed in 
                                                                                                                 
 146. Third Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 317-18.   
 147. Id. at 317.   
 148. Id. (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, the American 
Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU-Foundation of Pennsylvania, Inc., and the Center for 
Democracy and Technology in Support of Affirmance of the District Court, Third Cir. 
Decision, supra note 20 (No. 07-524M), 2009 WL 3866619).   
 149. Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 611. 
 150. Id. at 611-12. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30-37 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 153. Id. at 33-37. 
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Smith v. Maryland were notes on a musical scale, the location data sought 
here is a grand opera.”154  
Nor did the Fifth Circuit contend with Judge Smith’s argument that 
Congress’ passage of the Wireless Communication and Public Safety Act 
(WCPSA)155 in 1999 provided location records special status.156  According 
to Judge Smith, Congress’ prohibition on the disclosure of “call location 
information” without customers’ express prior authorization gives users a 
proprietary interest in their location records that they lack in ordinary 
business records.157  The Fifth Circuit’s opinion dismissed Judge Smith’s 
argument as an attempt to determine reasonable expectations of privacy 
based on a statute.158  As a later, specific statement by Congress about the 
nature of records containing location information, WCPSA arguably offers 
more valuable insight than the SCA into society’s views of location 
privacy.159   
The Fifth Circuit did recognize substantial limits on the applicability of 
the third party doctrine to location data.160  The court distinguished cases in 
which the government required the third party to collect and store the 
information,161 and applied the doctrine only when the “third party collects 
information in the first instance for its own purposes” (rather than for law-
enforcement purposes) and the government later claims that it can obtain 
the information.162  The decision included a quote from Smith that could be 
interpreted to weaken the line it appeared to draw: “‘The fortuity of whether 
or not the [third party] in fact elects to make a quasi-permanent record’ of 
information conveyed to it ‘does not . . . make any constitutional 
                                                                                                                 
 154. Houston Decision, supra note 46, at 846. 
 155. Wireless Communication and Public Safety Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-81, § 5, 
113 Stat. 1286, 1288 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2012)). 
 156. Houston Decision, supra note 46, at 841-43. 
 157. Id. at 842-43 (citing legislative history that evidenced concern for privacy interests 
in location information). 
 158. Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 608 n.10. 
 159. See Recent Case, supra note 93, at 1226 (“The WCPSA thus suggests that Congress 
intended that individuals’ privacy interest in location data be given particular weight in 
privacy assessments.”). 
 160. Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 611. 
 161. Id. at 610. 
 162. Id.; see also Recent Case, supra note 93, at 1223 (reading the decision to find “cell-
site location data” to be “unprotected business records [when] the records are created by the 
cell service provider, the records memorialize transactions to which the provider is a party, 
the government does not require or encourage the preparation or retention of such records, 
and the user voluntarily conveys the data to the service provider”).  
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difference.’”163  But the opinion went on to repeat that location records are 
business records subject to the third party doctrine because “the 
Government merely comes in after the fact and asks a provider to turn over 
records the provider has already created.”164 
As discussed above, the government’s applications had requested that, 
after receipt of the D order, the providers collect duration and recipient 
information, store it, and then forward that information to the requesting 
law enforcement agency.165  Not only would the government’s expansive 
definition of a “record” strain the statutory meaning, but it also would not 
constitute a business record, subject to the third party doctrine, under the 
Fifth Circuit’s definition.  That may explain why the Fifth Circuit did not 
grant the government’s request for any location data except initiation and 
termination data.166  Unfortunately, by not specifically addressing the 
government’s application, the Fifth Circuit left the constitutional question 
somewhat unclear.167  
In sum, the Third Circuit rejected application of the third party doctrine 
to users’ Fourth Amendment claims in their location data, but the Fifth 
Circuit accepted it.  The latter rejected Fourth Amendment claims only as to 
location information collected at the start and end of a call initiated by the 
target.168  The Fifth Circuit clearly indicated that it was not addressing 
applications for location information “for the duration of the call or when 
the phone is idle” or about “the recipient of a call” from the target phone.169  
The government’s application raised the question of the Fourth Amendment 
status of acquisition of that type of information, while other cases have 
concerned access to location information associated with text messages and 
internet use.  The Fifth Circuit’s opinion merely left the door open to such 
                                                                                                                 
 163. Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 610 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735, 745 (1979)); see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (opining that 
there would be no Fourth Amendment violation even if banks were storing information at 
the behest of the government). 
 164. Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 612. 
 165. See supra text accompanying note 114. 
 166. Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 615 (holding that D Orders “for specified cell 
phones at the points at which the user places and terminates a call are not categorically 
unconstitutional”). 
 167. I made reference to the government’s applications in my brief, see Freiwald Brief, 
supra note 114, and read from them at oral argument.   
 168. Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 615.  
 169. Id.  The decision did not clearly cover location information collected when the 
target receives calls. 
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claims without encouraging them.  The resulting lack of clarity leaves little 
to guide either lower courts or Congress.   
The Fifth Circuit’s reading of the third party doctrine also preserves 
Fourth Amendment claims about location data collected after the 
government’s request for an order or collected at the behest of the 
government.  It preserves claims arising from when the provider acts as an 
intermediary rather than a party, such as when collection of data does not 
advance the providers’ own business interests.170  It remains unclear how to 
draw those lines through current practices.  For example, when the 
government requests information about a cell phone user who is not the 
provider’s subscriber, any records so collected would seem to advance only 
the government’s interests—as distinguished from the provider’s business 
interests—and therefore fall outside of the Fifth Circuit’s third party 
exception to Fourth Amendment protection.171   
B. The Appellate Courts Did Not Conclude Whether Compelled Disclosure 
of Location Data Intrudes on Reasonable Expectations of Privacy 
Prior to Jones, when the Supreme Court determined that law 
enforcement agents conducted a Fourth Amendment search because they 
physically trespassed by installing a GPS device on Jones’ car to track his 
movements,172 courts determined whether the Fourth Amendment applied 
based on whether an investigation intruded on reasonable expectations of 
privacy.173  The Supreme Court affirmed in Jones that the reasonable 
expectations of privacy test remains the appropriate test for those 
investigations, like the compelled disclosure of location data, that do not 
involve physical trespasses.174  This subsection discusses the few doctrines 
                                                                                                                 
 170. Judge Lenihan doubted whether the collection of most types of location data 
satisfied the Fifth Circuit’s standard for falling within the third party doctrine. Pittsburgh 
Decision, supra note 45, at 615 (finding providers retain location data “principally, if not 
exclusively, in response to Government directive” rather than to “serve any business purpose 
for the customer or for the provider in serving the customer”); see also Klayman v. Obama, 
957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 31-32 (D.D.C. 2013) (discussing the cooperative relationship that has 
developed between the telecom companies and government surveillance officials). 
 171. See Nathaniel Gleicher, Comment, Neither a Customer Nor a Subscriber Be: 
Regulating the Release of User Information on the World Wide Web, 118 YALE L.J. 1945 
(2009) (describing how the SCA may not extend some protections to those who are neither 
subscribers nor customers). 
 172. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950-51 (2012).  
 173. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 174. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953; id. at 954-55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Klayman, 957 F. 
Supp. 2d at 29 (using reasonable expectations of privacy to analyze Fourth Amendment 
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the appellate courts used to determine whether agents intruded on 
reasonable expectations of privacy, further limiting the guidance those 
cases provide to legislatures. 
The Third Circuit’s analysis focused on two Supreme Court cases from 
the 1980s concerning police tracking by radio-beepers installed on the 
defendants’ belongings.175  The Supreme Court found no intrusion into 
reasonable expectations of privacy when the device tracked the defendant 
on public highways in United States v. Knotts.176  The Court found such an 
intrusion in United States v Karo when the surveillance revealed to agents 
that the defendant was at home—a fact not open to visual surveillance.177  
The Third Circuit viewed as significant whether an order requiring 
production of location data could reveal the target’s location in her home.178  
Although Judge Lenihan found that location data intrudes on privacy 
interests in the home,179 the Third Circuit concluded that the record did not 
yield sufficient evidence to determine that the location records the 
government sought would have extended into the home.180  The majority’s 
decision certainly suggested that the magistrate judge should determine that 
question on remand,181 but it did not explicitly require it.182  The concurring 
judge would have directed magistrate judges to refuse to grant a location 
data order for an application meeting the D order showing only when “the 
order would violate the Fourth Amendment absent a showing of probable 
cause because it allows police access to information which reveals a cell 
phone user’s location within the interior or curtilage of his home.”183 
The Fifth Circuit entertained at some length the question of whether 
location information permitted law enforcement agents to determine that a 
                                                                                                                 
claims regarding government searching through telephony metadata because plaintiffs 
lacked a possessory interest in their phone data). 
 175. Third Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 312. 
 176. 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983). 
 177. 468 U.S. 705, 719 (1984). 
 178. Third Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 311-12.   
 179. Pittsburgh Decision, supra note 45, at 613 (finding that “practical limitations on the 
abilities of [providers] to filter their [location data] would almost certainly result in over-
inclusive disclosures, and thus in transgressions of Constitutional boundaries”). 
 180. Third Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 313. 
 181. See id. at 317 (complaining that the government’s position would preclude the 
Magistrate Judge from “making a judgment about the possibility that such disclosure would 
implicate the Fourth Amendment, as it could if it would disclose location information about 
the interior of a home”). 
 182. See supra text accompanying note 89. 
 183. Third Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 320 (Tashima, J., concurring). 
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target was in her home.184  In the Houston Decision below, Judge Smith 
based his requirement of a warrant for access to location data primarily on 
his determination that location data had become sufficiently precise to 
reveal information inside the home.185  Specifically, Judge Smith found that 
“[o]ver the course of two months, it is inevitable that dozens if not hundreds 
of calls and text messages of a typical user will be sent from home, office, 
or other place out of public view” subject to Fourth Amendment 
protection.186  The Fifth Circuit noted the arguments on both sides of the 
question, but ultimately did not resolve whether location data revealed 
inside-the-home information because it disposed of the constitutional 
question presented based on the third party doctrine.187 
The only affirmative constitutional analysis the appellate courts have 
ratified for determining reasonable expectations of privacy in location data , 
then, is based on the doctrine that the Fourth Amendment protects our 
privacy interests in the home and surrounding areas.  The Third Circuit 
affirmed that doctrine’s vitality and did not elaborate on other ways to 
analyze reasonable expectations of privacy.188  The Fifth Circuit certainly 
did not deny the doctrine, but neither did the court demonstrate its 
application.189  It did not analyze reasonable expectations of privacy in 
location data because it used the third party doctrine and a narrowing 
construction of the question presented to limit its inquiry. 
C. The Appellate Courts Have Not Affirmed Lower Courts’ Expanded 
Analyses 
The magistrate judges who have found that law enforcement’s compelled 
disclosure of location data implicates Fourth Amendment privacy interests 
have often considered other approaches to the constitutional analysis.  
Those approaches could guide legislators interested in coming up with 
provisions to regulate law enforcement access to location records.  
However, none of those approaches has received the imprimatur of an 
appellate court. 
As a secondary basis for the Houston Decision, Judge Smith opined that 
location records are subject to Fourth Amendment protection under a 
prolonged surveillance theory, according to which the government’s request 
                                                                                                                 
 184. Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 608-09. 
 185. Houston Decision, supra note 46, at 835-38. 
 186. Id. at 836. 
 187. Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 610.   
 188. Third Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 312. 
 189. Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 609.  
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for two months of data was more intrusive into reasonable expectations of 
privacy than a shorter inquiry.190  As it came after the Houston Decision, 
Judge Smith did not rely on Jones, but rather on the reasoning of the 
appellate court in United States v. Maynard, the decision the Supreme 
Court affirmed on appeal in Jones.191   
Neither the Third nor the Fifth Circuit used the prolonged surveillance 
doctrine in its reasoning.  The Third Circuit Decision predated Maynard so 
obviously did not refer to it.  The Fifth Circuit Decision rejected the idea 
that it would “create a new rule” based on the fact that the records requested 
“cover more than some specified time period.” 192  In its brief to the Fifth 
Circuit, the government argued that the court should not recognize the 
prolonged surveillance doctrine as binding because only concurring Justices 
had approved it, although five concurring Justices had done so.193 
The magistrate judges also considered the nature of information sought 
in their analysis.  For example, both Judge Smith and Judge Lenihan 
discussed the revealing nature of location information.  Judge Lenihan 
“observe[d] that the location information so broadly sought is 
extraordinarily personal and potentially sensitive.”194  Judge Smith agreed 
with Magistrate Judge Orenstein that cell phone tracking may be more 
intrusive and revealing than tracking by a GPS device because people take 
their cell phones with them everywhere they go, including often to their 
bedsides.195  
The lower courts also referred, briefly, to the secret nature of location 
record acquisition; disclosures generally happen without targets knowing 
about them.  As Judge Lenihan explained, “[T]he ex parte nature of the 
proceedings, the comparatively low cost to the Government of the 
information requested, and the undetectable nature of a [provider’s] 
                                                                                                                 
 190. Houston Decision, supra note 46, at 838. 
 191. Id. at 838-39 (deriving the prolonged surveillance doctrine from United States v. 
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945 (2012)).  Judge Smith gave credit to a previous decision for its reliance on Maynard to 
resolve the constitutional question.  See id. (citing Brooklyn I Decision, supra note 106, at 
585). 
 192. Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 615. 
 193. Reply Brief of United States at 16, Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20 (No. 11-
20884), 2012 WL 10205101. 
 194. Pittsburgh Decision, supra note 45, at 586; see also id. at 609 (opining that the 
procedural hurdle to be overcome depends on the “nature of the records or information 
sought”). 
 195. Houston Decision, supra note 46, at 840 (citing Brooklyn I Decision, supra note 
106, at 590-91); see also Brooklyn II Decision, supra note 106, at 119. 
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electronic transfer of such information, render these requests particularly 
vulnerable to abuse.”196  Judge Lenihan also discussed the risk that 
monitoring location data would have a chilling effect on First Amendment 
protected associational activities.197  
In considering reasonable expectations of privacy, several of the 
magistrate judges referred to their obligation to engage in a normative 
analysis about what the emerging law should be.  Judge Lenihan quoted 
language in which Justice Harlan, in dissent, indicated that “[t]he critical 
question, therefore, is whether under our system of government, as reflected 
in the Constitution, we should impose on our citizens, the risk of the 
electronic listener or observer without at least the protection of a warrant 
requirement.”198  In finding the SCA unconstitutional because it permitted 
access to location data without a probable cause warrant, Judge Orenstein, 
of the Eastern District of New York, refused to “abandon[] the critical and 
continuing task of identifying the expectations of privacy our society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable.”199  Judge Garaufis, also of the Eastern 
District of New York, in coming to the same conclusion as Judge Orenstein, 
reasoned that under a proper “‘normative inquiry,’” users have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their cumulative location records.200  
Interestingly, in finding reasonable expectations of privacy and requiring 
a probable cause warrant for compelled access to stored email by ISPs, the 
Sixth Circuit, in Warshak, engaged in the same type of normative 
analysis.201  But Warshak is an appellate case that gives clear guidance to a 
Congress interested in updating the electronic surveillance laws.  By 
avoiding a normative analysis of location data, or any sustained analysis of 
how to evaluate reasonable expectations of privacy in location data, the 
                                                                                                                 
 196. Pittsburgh Decision, supra note 45, at 586, 586 n.7 (citing Freiwald, First 
Principles, supra note 24, ¶ 10).  I argued in the article cited that when the four factors of 
continuous, indiscriminate, intrusive, and hidden characterize a law enforcement 
investigation, then the highest form of judicial oversight should apply.  Freiwald, First 
Principles, supra note 24, ¶ 76; see also Freiwald, supra note 7, at 746-48 (arguing that the 
four-factor analysis yields the conclusion that compelled disclosure of location records that 
cover a period time should require a warrant based on probable cause).  
 197. Pittsburgh Decision, supra note 45, at 612. 
 198. Id. at 612 n.70 (quoting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting)). 
 199. Brooklyn I Decision, supra note 106, at 596.  
 200. Brooklyn II Decision, supra note 106, at 124 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735, 741 n.5 (1979)). 
 201. See Freiwald, supra note 7, at 745-46 (discussing Warshak’s normative analysis). 
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appellate courts have provided no similar guidance and instead left 
Congress in the dark.202 
III. The Standards Provide Valuable Guidance to Congress 
The LEATPR Standards provide a framework for members of Congress 
interested in drafting an entirely new law or amending the SCA to address 
law enforcement’s compelled disclosure of location records from service 
providers.  The Standards direct legislators first to consider what level of 
privacy a particular type of records should have, and from there they 
provide guidance on how to select the appropriate procedural hurdle and 
other statutory protections based on the level of privacy protection.203  This 
Part addresses how the Standards’ guidance on how to select a privacy level 
and what privacy protections to provide adds significantly to the guidance 
that appellate court opinions furnish on location records access by law 
enforcement. 
A. The Standards Advise Consideration of a Richer Body of Factors 
As discussed in Part II, two appellate cases to date have given conflicting 
and severely limited guidance on the Fourth Amendment protection of 
location data.  They have disagreed on whether the third party doctrine 
obviates protection.  They have also failed to determine whether, and if so 
when, users entertain reasonable expectations of privacy in location 
information, besides engaging in a limited discussion of the nonpublic 
space doctrine.  The lower courts have expanded the analysis considerably 
more, but in nonbinding decisions that the appellate courts have not 
affirmed. 
The Standards, because they make recommendations to policy makers 
who are free to legislate above the floor set by the Fourth Amendment, 
advise interested legislators to consider a wider range of factors than even 
those the magistrate judges have so far considered.  Because they draw 
from a variety of sources, the Standards encourage lawmakers to take a 
broader view of the issues, which if taken seriously, would significantly 
enrich the discussion of electronic surveillance regulation.204 
                                                                                                                 
 202. See Recent Case, supra note 93, at 1223-27 (citing Freiwald, First Principles, supra 
note 24) (arguing that the Fifth Circuit should have conducted a normative analysis instead 
of merely a positive one). 
 203. See generally Henderson, supra note 4 (reviewing in detail how the Standards 
would apply to location data). 
 204. See id. at 813, 815-18 (describing the factors to be considered in the context of 
location records). 
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For example, in determining the proper privacy category for location 
records, the Standards advise legislators to consider, in addition to current 
law, 
present and developing technology and the extent to which: 
 (a) the initial transfer of such information to an institutional 
third party is reasonably necessary to participate meaningfully in 
society or in commerce, or is socially beneficial, including to 
freedom of speech and association;  
 (b) such information is personal, including the extent to which 
it is intimate and likely to cause embarrassment or stigma if 
disclosed, and whether outside of the initial transfer to an 
institutional third party it is typically disclosed only within one’s 
close social network, if at all; [and] 
 (c) such information is accessible to and accessed by non-
government persons outside the institutional third party.205 
Regarding location records, paragraph (a) would have legislators look 
much more closely at the creation of location records than either current 
statutory or constitutional law.  As a matter of the former, nothing in the 
text of the SCA turns on how records are created.  As for constitutional law, 
paragraph (a) encourages legislatures to recognize a fundamental criticism 
of the third party doctrine: that it presumes that people assume the risk of 
compelled disclosure when they share information, without inquiring into 
whether they had a choice not to share the information.206  As Judge Leon 
recognized in Klayman, which is a preliminary decision by a district court 
and does not concern compelled disclosure of location records, Americans 
now use their cell phones to a staggering degree, and many people rely 
solely on their cell phones for their voice and text communications.207  
Paragraph (a) directs legislators to engage in deeper analysis of the 
conditions under which users disclose location data to their providers than 
the Fifth Circuit did when it reasoned that voluntary use of a cell phone was 
sufficient to waive a constitutional privacy interest in some location data. 
Notably, paragraph (a) does not require legislators to determine that the 
disclosure of location data is unavoidable in order to accord such data more 
                                                                                                                 
 205. STANDARD 25-4.1(a)-(c). 
 206. STANDARD 25-4.1(a) commentary. 
 207. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 34 n.51 (D.D.C. 2013); see also STANDARD 
25-4.1(a) commentary (citing similar statistics). 
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privacy protection.  The Standards’ drafters recognize that people should 
not be viewed as voluntarily relinquishing their private information when 
they must do so to participate meaningfully in society.  They also recognize 
a value in participating meaningfully in commerce, so they instruct 
legislators to be sympathetic to claims that users want to take advantage of 
technological innovation without having to give up their privacy.   
In addition, by having legislatures consider whether they want to 
encourage the transfer of information to providers because doing so furthers 
speech, associational, or other socially beneficial values, the Standards’ 
drafters focus on the subjective chill that excessive surveillance creates.  
Recent Supreme Court decisions have rejected privacy claims that could not 
definitively establish surveillance208 or monetize the harm from disclosure 
of information,209 but the Standards remind legislators that other legal 
authority provides a basis to protect privacy so as not to have undue 
surveillance inhibit valuable activities.210  The Standards’ drafters make 
clear that location records represent just the type of records that have 
benefited society, and that the Supreme Court has recognized the value of 
cell phone use for self-expression and self-identification, though only in 
dicta.211 
In paragraph (b), the Standards’ drafters focus legislators’ attention on 
the characteristics of the information in the records, such as whether it is 
personal, intimate, or embarrassing.212  Other than distinguishing between 
records relating to telecommunication fraud and records containing basic 
subscriber information, both of which receive less protection, the SCA 
treats all records the same so long as they pertain to the user’s or 
subscriber’s use of a provider’s system.213  Under the appellate courts’ 
                                                                                                                 
 208. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148-50 (2013) (denying plaintiffs 
standing because they failed to establish that the NSA had acquired their communications 
pursuant to section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 
2008).  
 209. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 620 (2004) (requiring plaintiffs to prove “actual 
damages” to receive recovery for disclosure of their social security numbers in violation of 
the Privacy Act of 1974). 
 210. STANDARD 25-4.1(a) commentary (citing lower court cases discussing chill and 
noting that “with mobile telephony the contribution to the freedoms of expression and 
association are quite strong”). 
 211. Id. (citing City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010) (dictum)). 
 212. STANDARD 25-4.1(b). 
 213. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2012). 
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constitutional analysis,214 the characteristics of the information listed in 
paragraph (b) are arguably related to an analysis of whether the records 
divulge that the target was inside her home.215  Similarly, the Fifth Circuit 
explicitly carved out from Fourth Amendment protection, through use of 
the third party doctrine, business records that the provider collects for its 
own purposes,216 which may, by implication, exclude some personal or 
intimate information collected out of mere curiosity or to violate privacy.217  
But neither appellate court affirmed the more expansive inquiry that the 
magistrate judges conducted into the revealing and sensitive nature of the 
information that location data can reveal, particularly when it covers a 
prolonged period. 
The Standards’ drafters affirmed the legitimacy of the prolonged 
surveillance approach to location records that Judge Smith and other 
magistrates had found helpful.  In elaborating on paragraph (b), the drafters 
recognize that location information over a significant period reveals an 
intimate picture that a target does not expect anyone else, except perhaps 
her spouse, to see.218  They also affirmed making a much more thoughtful 
inquiry into what the location data reveals. 
Paragraph (c) of Standard 25-4.1 directs legislators to consider the extent 
to which the information at issue is “accessible to and accessed by non-
government persons” besides the provider.219  According to the Standards 
commentary, the drafters do not mean to “further tip the scales” beyond the 
analysis in paragraph (b), but rather to recognize that when people make 
some otherwise personal information available to many other private 
parties, “law enforcement need not alone ‘shield its eyes.’”220  The 
Standards commentary does not apply paragraph (c) to location data or any 
other category of records. It cautions that the factor is “dependent upon the 
                                                                                                                 
 214. See Third Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 311-13, 317; Fifth Cir. Decision, supra 
note 20, at 608-10. 
 215. See United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 37-39 (2001) (opining that, in the home, all 
details are intimate, a position discussed in the commentary to Standard 25-4.1(b)). 
 216. Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 611-12.  
 217. See Adam Gabbatt, NSA Analysts ‘Wilfully Violated’ Surveillance Systems, Agency 
Admits, GUARDIAN (Aug. 24, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-
analysts-abused-surveillance-systems (reporting NSA analysts’ abuse of agency surveillance 
systems to spy on love interests). 
 218. STANDARD 25-4.1(b) commentary (citing United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 
563 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
 219. STANDARD 25-4.1(c).  
 220. STANDARD 25-4.1(c) commentary (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 
(1986)) (referring to the Fourth Amendment’s plain view doctrine). 
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norms and actions within a particular jurisdiction”221 and that legislatures 
should consider “social norms and practical realities” and “not merely that 
private persons theoretically could access information, but that they in fact 
do so.”222  
The commentary to paragraph (b) suggests that the drafters may view 
disclosure of location data in social network contexts as influencing the 
privacy protection applicable to the compelled disclosure of location 
records.223  I would read that to mean that if someone makes location data 
publicly available online, then that limits the privacy protection of that 
specific information, if it is available in a provider’s records as well.224  
Otherwise, the public viewing of some people’s limited location data would 
be able to reduce the privacy of other people’s much more extensive 
location data gathered in a secret manner through compelled disclosure.225 
B. The Standards Remind Legislators to Consider a Range of Protections 
As Parts I and II discussed, debates about how current law regulates 
access to location records have concerned whether judges may or must 
impose a probable cause standard before agents may obtain an order to 
compel disclosure of location records, or whether they may or must accept 
a reasonable and articulable facts showing.  Section 2703(c) specifically 
excuses law enforcement agents from providing notice to targets that their 
providers have disclosed their location data;226 the appellate courts have not 
considered other procedural protections besides the showing needed to 
obtain the court order.  
The Standards address the showing that agents must make before they 
may obtain an order to compel disclosure of location records.227  The 
                                                                                                                 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Professor Henderson’s article supports that limited view, as he notes that he does 
not see any evidence of this factor supporting a lack of privacy in location records.  
Henderson, supra note 4, at 817. 
 225. The ambiguity here highlights a problem with categorization by general type of 
information rather than by method of access.  For approaches promoting regulation by 
method of access, see Freiwald, supra note 7; David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to 
Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013).  The Standards do not preclude further 
categorization, however.  See Henderson, supra note 4, at 832 (citing Slobogin, supra note 
143, at 24-27, 35) (“[M]y preference, like that of Christopher Slobogin, is to vary the 
regulation solely by time.”).  
 226. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(3) (2012). 
 227. See Henderson, supra note 4, at 813, 815-18. 
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Standards’ framework matches procedural hurdles to the privacy categories 
that lawmakers choose for a category of records based on their 
consideration of the relevant factors.228  Without doing a full analysis 
myself, I would agree with Stephen Henderson’s recent conclusion that 
most location records would fall under the highly private category.229  
Professor Henderson would treat information for a period of up to twenty-
four hours as moderately private,230 and information for a single point in 
time as not private.231  For highly protected information, the Standards 
recommend a court order based on “a judicial determination that there is 
probable cause to believe the information in the record contains or will lead 
to evidence of a crime.”232  That formulation would certainly need to be 
supplemented by further restrictions on scope so as not to permit fishing 
expeditions.233  
In addition, the Standards state that notice should be provided to the 
focus of the record, generally within thirty days of disclosure, for all highly 
and moderately protected information.234  In elaborating on the 
recommendation that legislators require notice for both types of protected 
information, the Standards commentary refers approvingly to Judge Smith’s 
pioneering work on the excessive secrecy of current electronic surveillance 
practices.235  The Standards recommendation would go a long way toward 
                                                                                                                 
 228. See id.  
 229. Id. at 819. 
 230. Id.  The Standards recommend a court order based on reasonable suspicion, which is 
what the reasonable and articulable facts standard is modeled upon, for moderately protected 
records.  STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(ii); STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(ii).  The Standards bracket a choice 
to provide a court order or a prosecutorial certification based on relevance for moderately 
protected records.  STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(iii), (iv); STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(ii). 
 231. Henderson, supra note 4, at 819.  In my article analyzing compelled disclosure of 
location records under the Fourth Amendment, I doubted that agents would know in advance 
that they were seeking circumscribed information.  Freiwald, supra note 7, at 747.  If they do 
focus on information for one particular time, perhaps a lesser showing than probable cause 
would be acceptable so long as other protections were in place.  See Pell & Soghoian, supra 
note 3, at 183-93 (describing notice, minimization, and reporting requirements for a location 
data statute).   
 232. STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(i); STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(i). 
 233. See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 3, at 180-81 (recommending a nexus requirement 
to go along with their procedural hurdle for access to historical location data); see also id. at 
183-93 (recommending other procedural rules to rein in investigations and provide privacy 
and transparency).      
 234. STANDARD 25-5.7 commentary. 
 235. Id. at n.358 (citing Stephen Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming 
ECPA’s Secret Docket, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 313, 314 (2012)).  
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promoting the transparency and accountability that Judge Smith 
recommended in his article.236  Moreover, by providing notice to all who 
are the focus of records, and not just those whom law enforcement 
subsequently prosecutes on the basis of what it finds, the Standards’ 
approach promises to solve the significant problem Judge Smith identified: 
innocent people never find out that their privacy has been invaded.237  
As further procedural protections against abusive practices, the Standards 
remind legislators to consider “more demanding restraints” for access to 
records containing highly protected information.238  The Standards suggest 
requiring: “additional administrative approval, additional disclosure, greater 
investigative need, or procedures for avoiding access to irrelevant 
information.”239  The Standards’ list draws from protective procedures that 
Congress imposed on wiretapping and eavesdropping in the 1968 Wiretap 
Act.240  It reminds Congress that when practices raise the risk of abuse, a 
requirement of probable cause is not the only protection available.241   
C. The Standards Promote a Properly Limited Scope for the Third Party 
Doctrine  
When the Fifth Circuit considered the third party doctrine, it rejected the 
Third Circuit’s conclusion that users were not sufficiently aware of the 
collection and storage of their location data to have assumed the risk of its 
disclosure—at least as to initiation and termination data.242  The Fifth 
Circuit’s opinion found that modern cell phone users know that their cell 
phones use cell towers because users are aware that they may be out of 
range of their providers’ network and because their providers’ terms of 
service and privacy policies disclose that such providers use location 
                                                                                                                 
 236. See Henderson, supra note 4, at 821 (“Such notice would be a significant 
improvement to federal law.” (citing Smith, supra note 235)). 
 237. See Smith, supra note 235, at 332.  Compare Or. Prescription Monitoring Program 
v. DEA, No. 3:12-cv-02012-HA, 2014 WL 562938, at *4 n.2 (D. Or. Feb. 11, 2014) (noting 
the likely lack of challenges to the DEA’s practice of acquiring stored prescription data from 
a central database when the DEA does not notify subjects of its access), with Susan Freiwald 
& Sylvain Métille, Reforming Surveillance Law: The Swiss Model, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1261, 1299-1300 (2013) (noting that under Swiss surveillance law, the target of records 
surveillance receives after-the-fact notice in all cases). 
 238. STANDARD 25-5.3(b). 
 239. Id. 
 240. STANDARD 25-5.3(b) commentary. 
 241. I have promoted the additional protections of the Wiretap Act for online 
surveillance practices as well.  Freiwald, supra note 69, at 74-84.  
 242. Fifth Cir. Decision, supra note 20, at 613 (calling the Third Circuit’s analysis a 
“crabbed understanding . . . [that] would lead to absurd results”). 
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information to route calls.243  The court found that users voluntarily convey 
location data when they make calls because they choose to get phones, to 
select particular providers, and to make calls; they know that calls convey 
location information and that providers retain that information, which they 
will turn over to the police when presented with a court order.244   
The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning applies the third party doctrine to deny 
privacy protection to location records in an expansive and erroneous 
manner that the Standards do not replicate.  Instead, the Standards 
recognize that there are only two ways for a cell phone user to assume the 
risk that her provider will disclose her records: (1) when she knowingly and 
voluntarily consents to such disclosure245 or (2) when the provider, 
voluntarily and on its own initiative, discloses the user’s records.246  In the 
absence of either of those circumstances, the Standards’ framework applies, 
notwithstanding that location records constitute the provider’s business 
records. 
According to the Standards, law enforcement should be able merely to 
request particular location records when the “focus of the record has 
knowingly and voluntarily consented to that specific law enforcement 
access”247 or that person gave “generalized consent to law enforcement 
access, and . . . it was possible to decline the generalized consent and still 
obtain the desired service from the provider requesting consent, and the 
focus of the record had specifically acknowledged that it was possible.”248  
According to the Standards commentary, for highly and moderately 
protected information such as location records, law enforcement agents 
should have to point to individualized agreements to show that users waived 
their privacy rights by agreeing to law enforcement access.249  The 
Standards’ drafters do not agree with the Fifth Circuit’s logic that by using 
a provider whose terms of service and privacy policies indicate that law 
enforcement has access to location records, users thereby waive any privacy 
rights in those location records.   
The Standards recognize that a user may waive her privacy rights in her 
location records when her provider voluntarily conveys them to law 
                                                                                                                 
 243. Id. (finding also that terms of service and privacy policies indicate that the providers 
store location data and may share it with the government). 
 244. Id. at 614. 
 245. STANDARD 25-5.1(a)-(b). 
 246. STANDARD 25-2.1(f)(ii). 
 247. STANDARD 25-5.1(a). 
 248. STANDARD 25-5.1(b). 
 249. STANDARD 25-5.1(b) commentary. 
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enforcement “entirely upon its own initiative.”250  The Standards carve out 
provider-initiated disclosures from coverage because such disclosures count 
as private conduct, which Congress may choose to regulate,251 but which do 
not fall under the purview of criminal procedure.252  The Commentary 
clarifies that “[t]he situation is markedly different, however, when law 
enforcement initiates a specific contact with a particular third party, and 
that contact leads to a records transfer.”253  In the latter case, the provider 
should be treated as an agent of the government, and the protections of the 
Standards should apply.254   
The commentary to paragraph (a) explicitly dispenses with the idea that 
the assumption of risk doctrine applies equally when law enforcement 
compels the provider to disclose records as to the case when the provider 
initiates disclosure himself.  The commentary explains that even though one 
accepts the risk that law enforcement will obtain information one chooses 
to disclose to another, “it begs the question to presume that there must 
therefore be no restraint upon law enforcement access, for it is the law that 
defines what risk is thereby assumed.”255  Maintaining the crucial 
distinction, the commentary continues to explain that “[e]ven were there to 
be no restraint upon voluntary third party-initiated dissemination, it would 
not follow that there should be no restraint upon law enforcement-initiated 
access.”256 
The Standards’ distinction properly reins in the third party doctrine to 
keep it from depriving users, whose records are the subject of compelled 
disclosure orders, of privacy protections.  It also more properly aligns with 
the genesis of the third party doctrine.  In the Miller case, when the 
Supreme Court first enunciated the doctrine, it based its reasoning on the 
Hoffa/White line of cases.257  But those cases concerned the risk that the 
person to whom the defendant disclosed information himself voluntarily 
                                                                                                                 
 250. STANDARD 25-2.1(f)(ii) commentary (referring to Standard 25-2.1(f)(ii), under 
which the Standards “do not relate to . . . [a provider] deciding of its own initiative and 
volition to provide information to law enforcement”).   
 251. In fact, the SCA currently permits providers to disclose records to anyone except 
governmental entities.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2012).  
 252. STANDARD 25-2.1(f)(ii) commentary. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. STANDARD 25-4.1(a) commentary. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 138, at 154-56. 
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initiates the disclosure.  The Hoffa/White line did not involve the risk of 
compelled disclosure by law enforcement.258   
By stretching the third party doctrine to find that users assume the risk 
that their providers will be compelled to disclose their records, the Fifth 
Circuit and many lower courts have denied privacy protection where the 
Standards would provide it.  In addition, they have avoided engaging in a 
searching inquiry into the nature of the relationship between the providers 
and law enforcement that the Standards also promote.  They have accepted 
too quickly that by mere use of an essential tool of modern communication, 
users have lost the ability to raise legal claims to the privacy of their 
location information.  The Standards would not have legislators make that 
same analytical error. 
Conclusion 
The Standards provide important insights to legislators who want to fill 
the gap that is the current law on law enforcement access to location 
records.  They encourage law makers to extend their gaze well beyond the 
extremely limited consideration of whether location records would reveal 
information about the inside of the home to take account of a much wider 
range of significant questions about the nature of location records.  They 
correct several flaws in the Fifth Circuit’s approach to assumption of risk, 
including the notion that mere use of a provider coupled with likely 
constructive knowledge of the possibility of law enforcement access to 
records are sufficient to deprive a user of privacy protection in even a 
limited amount of location data.  Finally, they remind Congress that, while 
it matters what showing law enforcement agents must make to a judge 
before obtaining an order for location records, other procedural protections, 
such as notice, meaningfully contribute to transparency and accountability 
and help rein in abusive practices. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 258. For that reason, I have argued, with a co-author, for the same distinction between 
provider-initiated disclosure and compelled disclosure that the Standards promotes.  Id. at 
169.   
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